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txplicit pictures of young girls and boys - images
that to the human eye, appear to be real children
engaging in real sex acts. Yet, actually, such images can
be produced with readily available digital-imaging computer equipment. To many,these images are disgusting,
but to others, they are erotic. Either way, according
to the United States Supreme Court, a ban on these
explicit images is unconstitutional. I
The regulation of online child pornography has
been a touchy subject since the inception of the internet, and the debate has intensified with the internet's
increased popularity. For pedophiles seeking entertainment, the introduction of faster computers and
cheaper online access has fueled an unquenchable
thirst for online child pornography.2 Laws prohibiting
pornographic images of actual children could not
thwart pedophiles' desire to be entertained; as a result,
they have taken advantage of technological advances
to find another route to pleasure. These days, practically any "home-computer user can create photorealistic images that are virtually indistinguishable from
actual photographs." 3 Through the use of widely available digital-imaging technology, "real" children are no

American judicial system is to strike a delicate balance
between First Amendment free speech concerns and
the exploitation of children.I Most recently, the case
of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition garnered interest
because it concerned the CPPA and its review by the
United States Supreme Court.9 While the High Court
ultimately sided with the Free Speech Coalition, this
Note argues that things might have been different if
the government had fully explored all available legal
arguments in favor of the CPPA.
At first glance, the absence of actual child
actors in the production of digital child pornography
appears to upset the courts' traditional rationale for
upholding laws making child pornography illegal, but a
more in-depth analysis shows how virtual child pornography should still lack FirstAmendment protection
under the "advocacy of illegal conduct" 10 exception to
free speech.
Part I discusses the nature and origin of digital
child pornography and how child pornography has traditionally fit into First Amendment analysis. Part II
discusses Congress' reaction to digital innovations in
child pornography by passing the Child Pornography

longer needed to create child pornography. I The
United States is one of several countries that have
begun to grapple with the effects of this technological
revolution on the child pornography trade.' To prevent a loophole in the law, Congress responded to
these technological advances by passing the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA") 6 to fight
back against innovative pedophiles making and sharing
digital child pornography. The new technology, though,
has complicated the traditional legal framework prohibiting child pornography and raised constitutional
challenges to Congress' regulation of this high-tech
version of child pornography. 7 As with its analysis of
traditional child pornography, the challenge facing the

Prevention Act and, Part II further explains the federal
appellate courts' treatment of the CPPA. Part III discusses the history and arguments made for each side
in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Part IV discusses
the legal and constitutional analysis of the Supreme
Court in striking down the regulations that banned
digital child pornography. Finally, PartV makes an additional constitutional argument, largely unexplored by
the government in Free Speech, supporting the ban on
digital child pornography - that digital child pornography advocates illegal conduct to such a degree that
it incites imminent lawless action, specifically whetting
the appetites of pedophiles to seduce and harm real
children.
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A. Nature and Origin of
Digital Child Pornography
Developments in computer technology and
digital photography have facilitated both the creation
of child pornography and its distribution in cyberspace, thus increasing its availability to potential viewers." Through a variety of techniques, including scanning, morphing, and animation, computer users can
create virtual child pornography using inexpensive and
readily available software. 12 Some photo editing programs are available for as little as $50, although the
higher-end software such as Adobe Photoshop costs
around $600. '1 According to the Senate Report
accompanying the CPPA, these technologies allow
individuals to produce "visual depictions of children
engaging in sexually explicit conduct which are virtually indistinguishable to an unsuspecting viewer from
unretouched photographs of actual minors engaging in
such conduct." '1
There are two categories
of computer-generated pornography-computer-altered and virtual.
's "Virtual" child pornography does
not involve the depiction of an

"actual, identifiable minor."

6 "Com-

ment guarantees free speech, the Supreme Court
has carved exceptions for several different types of
speech including: child pornography, 2' obscenity,22 and
advocacy of illegal conduct. 2 With regard to actual
child pornography, the Supreme Court in New York
v. Ferber allowed a "time, place and manner" exception to the FirstAmendment. 24 Specifically,the Ferber
Court deemed the prohibition on child pornography
to be an incidental restriction, unrelated to the suppression of free expression, with a regulatory objective that furthered a compelling government interest
of protecting children from the harm of being used
as actors in the production of child pornography. 25
Under Miller v. California, the Court carved an exception to First Amendment protection for works that,
taken as a whole, "appeal to the prurient interest,
are patently offensive in light of community standards,
and lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." 26 Finally, regarding the "advocacy of illegal conduct" exception to First Amendment protection, the
Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 27 concluded that "con-

of the it

puter-altered child pornography," on
the other hand, does depict an
actual minor in some way. 17 In such
instances, a photograph of a real
child may be scanned and replicated, and an innocent
picture of a child may be manipulated by computer to
create a sexually-oriented photo. 8 Using a technique
called "morphing" original, innocent pictures taken
from books, magazines, or catalogs can be transformed
digitally into pictures depicting children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 1 These technological advances
have presented new problems for the old constitutional analysis of pornography involving actual children,
and seemingly created a loophole for virtual child pornography.

B. How Child Pornography Has
Traditionally Fit Into
First Amendment Analysis
According to the First Amendment, "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press..." 2 0 However, while the FirstAmend-
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stitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of law
violation where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
28
incite or produce such action."
In justifying bans on actual child pornography,
the Ferber and Osborne Supreme Court cases discussed infra did not rely on the obscenity standard set
forth in Miller or the "incitement of imminent lawless
action" rationale of Brandenburg because the Ferber
and Osborne courts found a compelling state interest in preventing harm to children used in the production of child pornography that was sufficient to sustain
an incidental "time, place, and manner" restriction on
child pornography. However, the Supreme Court in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition found that the Miller
obscenity standard was not met and no "time, place
and manner" restriction was justified with respect
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to virtual child pornography.29 This Note argues for
the regulation of digital child pornography because
it "incites imminent lawless action." This additional
exception to First Amendment protection continues
to justify a ban on virtual child pornography even
where actual child actors are not used. In order to
trace the development of child pornography regulation, it is necessary to start with a discussion of New
York v. Ferber and Osborne v. Ohio, where the original
framework was created for classifying child pornography as a category of material unprotected by the First
Amendment.
1

New York v. Ferber

In the 1982 landmark decision of New York v.
the Supreme Court held that child pornography was not worthy of FirstAmendment protection.
11 The Ferber court considered the constitutionality
of a NewYork criminal statute that prohibited the distribution of materials depicting sexual performances
by minors. 32 In upholding the constitutionality of this
statute, the Court offered five reasons for allowing
states greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic
depictions of children.33 Most significant to the current
analysis of digital child pornography, the Court found
that the distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related
to the sexual abuse of children in at least two ways.
14 The Court noted that the pornographic material
serves as a permanent record of the child's abuse, and,
most importantly, its distribution encourages the production of more child pornography."S
In conclusion, the Ferber Court pointed out
that in regulation of child pornography, the "evil to be
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake," that no case-by-case
adjudication would be required. 36 According to the
Court, when a definable class of material, such as that
covered by the NewYork statute,"bears so heavily and
pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its
production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck" and it is permissible to impose a
time, place and manner exception to the FirstAmendment protection of such materials."7
Ferber,3"

I1

borne v. Ohio

Eight years after the Ferber decision,the Court
was confronted with an Ohio statute that prohibited
the private possession and viewing of child pornography in the case of Osborne v. Ohio. 38 The Court

-116-

in Osborne accepted Ohio's three reasons for banning the private possession of child pornography: (I)
reducing the demand for child pornography which
would, in turn, reduce its production; (2) encouraging
the destruction of child pornography, the permanent
and potentially harmful record of a child's abuse; and
(3) eliminating materials that could be used by pedo39
philes to seduce other children into sexual activity.
Thus, the Osborne Court expanded the proscription
of child pornography introduced in Ferber. Whereas
the Ferber Court emphasized the harm inflicted on
children used in the production of pornographic material,40 Osborne articulated an additional harm done to
children whose inhibitions to engage in sexual conduct
are lowered where pedophiles use child pornography
4
to seduce other children into sexual activity. '

A. Child Pornography Prevention Act
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
("CPPA") 42 expanded the federal prohibitions on child
pornography such that simulations of children engaged
in explicit sexual conduct were deemed illegal. 43 The
relevant provision, as enacted, defines child pornography as "any visual depiction, including any photograph,
film, video image or picture" that "is, or appears to be,
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct" or
"is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression
that the material is or contains a visual depiction of
a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 44 Firsttime offenders may be fined, sentenced to a maximum
of fifteen years in prison, or both. 45 However, violators with a criminal record involving sexual abuse or
child pornography shall be fined under this title and
imprisoned for not less than 5 years nor more than
30 years. 46 The law provides an affirmative defense
for images produced using actual adults as long as
"the defendant did not advertise, promote, present,
describe, or distribute the material in such a manner
as to convey the impression that it is or contains a
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct. 47
Congress found that technology has enabled
producers of child pornography to alter innocent pictures of actual children, 48 such that this computeraltered pornography contains images of still-recogniz-
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able children and could affect their reputations for
years. 49 In general, Congress also found that computer-generated child pornography has many of the
same effects on children, as does pornography using
actual children.5 0 Perhaps most significantly,Congress
concluded that no distinction existed between using
"virtual" or "real" pornography to seduce and molest
children. 51 For these reasons and others, Congress
enacted the CPPA "to attack the rise of computerized
or 'virtual' child pornography." 2

B. Four Federal Courts of Appeals Have
Upheld the Constitutionality
of the CPPA
1

United States v. Hilton

The first challenge to the constitutionality of
the CPPA in federal court came in United States
v. Hilton 11 with the indictment of David Hilton
for possession of materials appearing to depict a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct under
18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B).4 Challenging the statute
on constitutional grounds, Hilton argued that section
2252A(a)(5)(B), in conjunction with the definition of
"child pornography" contained in section 2256(8)(B),
did not clearly identify the conduct which it prohibits.
11 Specifically, the defendant asserted that the definition of "child pornography," which includes visual
depictions that appear to be of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, is too subjective to enable ordinary persons to know with certainty what conduct
is prohibited by the statute. The United States District Court for the District of Maine agreed that the
CPPA's definition of "child pornography" creates substantial uncertainty for viewers presented with materials depicting post-pubescent individuals, for the determination as to whether those individuals have yet

reached eighteen years of age will often not be easy
or clear.16 Further, the District Court accepted defendant's argument that section 2252A(a)(5)(B) of the
CPPA was overbroad because a substantial amount of
protected expression involving young-looking adults
would be "chilled" by this statute.57
However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
unanimously rejected the district court's decision and
declared the CPPA constitutional. 58 Before upholding the constitutionality of the CPPA, the Hilton court
noted four lessons that could be drawn from the
Ferber and Osborne decisions. 19 Under that preexisting framework, the court held the CPPA was not
overbroad because "to the extent the CPPA criminalizes the possession, reproduction or distribution of a
visual representation of an actual minor engaged in
sexual conduct, it falls easily within the parameters
established by Ferber 60 and Osborne." 6' Further, the
court held that the government's interests in deterring
the direct abuse of children justified the "appropriate"
methods of the CPPA, and "Congress's statements
provide us with a precise and limited understanding of
the'appears to be' language." 62 In response to Hilton's
vagueness claims, the court went on to state that the
CPPA's "provisions 'suitably limit' the reach of the Act
so that a person of ordinary intelligence can easily discern likely unlawful conduct and conform his or her
63
conduct appropriately."

II. United States voAcheson
Similarly, in United States v. Acheson, 64 the
defendant was caught downloading child pornography
off the internet in violation of the CPPA. 61 The defendant,Acheson, contended that the "appears to be" language rendered the statute impermissibly vague, overbroad, and generally violative of the First Amendment. 66 The Acheson court found the CPPA to be a
content-based restriction that must
be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling governmental interest. 67 In
response to the defendant's claims

that the CPPA was overbroad, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that"the
CPPA's overbreadth is minimal when

viewed in light of its plainly legitimate
sweep." 68 According to the court,
"In crafting the definitional language

at issue in this case, Congress took
careful aim at a narrow range of
images that otherwise evaded the
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law's reach." 69 Specifically, Congress found that, "the
'appears to be' language targets images 'which are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from
unretouched photographs of actual children engaging
in identical sexual conduct." 70 Also, in support of it's
finding that the CPPA was not overbroad, the court
noted that under the statutory framework established
by Congress, a defendant charged with unlawful distribution or sale would be entitled to a complete defense
by showing that the person depicted was as an adult.
"' As for Acheson's vagueness claim, the court again
concurred with the standard enunciated in Hilton and
found that the "CPPA defines the criminal offense with
enough certainty to put an ordinary person on notice
of what conduct is prohibited." 72 Thus, in a unanimous panel decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's ruling and held that the CPPA was
constitutional. 7

. Unite.

.",s v.

The Fourth Circuit Court ofAppeals, in United
States v. Mento, 74 became the third federal appellate
court to issue a unanimous panel decision upholding
the constitutionality of the CPPA.75 Invoking Osborne,
the court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized government interests in combating child pornography such as shutting down the distribution network,
eliminating child pornography from the marketplace,
and keeping pedophiles from using it to coerce or
seduce other minors.76 In response to the defendant's
claim that Ferber limited the government's interests to
the protection of actual children, the court explained
that Ferber was decided long before computer-generated pornography became a problem. 77 The court
stated that the government's interest in protecting all
children from the sexual exploitation resulting from
child pornography - not just children used in its production - is compelling. 78 Because the "connection
between the virtual child pornography and the sexual
abuse of children is as powerful as the causal link that
justifies the utter prohibition of pornographic images
involving actual child participants," the court held that
79
the Act survives constitutional scrutiny.

The most recent federal appellate court to
consider and uphold the constitutionality of the CPPA
was the Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Fox
on April 13, 2001. 80 In Fox, the defendant appealed
after being convicted and sentenced for knowingly
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receiving child pornography via computer in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A.8' On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the defendant's conviction and upheld the
constitutionality of the CPPA. 82 Though the court
found Section 2252A to be a content-based restriction on speech subject to strict scrutiny, the court
held that Section 2252A's extension of the prohibition
on child pornography to visual depictions that "appear
to be" or "convey the impression of" minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct was fully consonant
with the FirstAmendment of the Constitution. 83 Specifically, Section 2252A survived strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment because Section 2252A was
the least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest 84 in protecting the "vulnerable young from the harms generated by child pornography." 8
In addition, the court held that Section 2252A
was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague.8 6 Fox's
overbreadth challenge was based on the application of
the statute to images of youthful-looking adult models.
87
As well as the affirmative defense for persons
depicted that are actually adults at the time the images
are created, the court found significant the statute's
scienter requirement, "which applies to the age of the
persons depicted as well as the nature of the materi-

als." 88
After discarding Fox's overbreadth claim, the
court considered Fox's claim that Section 2252A's
"appears to be" language is "overly subjective" and thus
creates "substantial uncertainty" for viewers because
it may be difficult to distinguish between depictions
of teenagers from those of young adults with even
younger appearances. 89 The Fox court considered
the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Free Speech
Coalition v. Reno,9" discussed infra, which found the
CPPA's provisions unconstitutionally vague. Yet, ultimately, the court decided in accord with the analysis of
the First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits,9' agreeing that
the "appears to be" language was "not so subjective as
to fail to put reasonable persons on notice of what it
92
is that the statute prohibits."

A. Origin of the Case
The only federal appellate court striking down
the CPPA as unconstitutional has been the Ninth Circuit in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno. 93 After the
CPPA was signed into law, the Free Speech Coalition

Reacting to Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and the Burial of the CPPA
and others (respondents) filed suit in the Northern
District of California against the Attorney General of
the United States and the United States Department
of Justice. "I The Free Speech Coalition is a "trade
association of businesses involved in the production
and distribution of'adult-oriented materials;' and the
other respondents were a publisher of a book on
nudism, an artist who paints nudes, and a photographer who specializes in erotic photography. 9 Respondents alleged that the "appears to be" and the "conveys the impression" provisions of the CPPA are vague
and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. 96

ally overbroad, and the CPPA was not unconstitution-

ally vague. 102

B. Appeal to the Ninth Circuit
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the CPPA restricts speech
based on its content. '01 The court ruled that the government was required to show that the CPPA's provisions were narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest. '04 The court found that those provisions were not supported by a compelling interest and
the CPPA was unconstitutional because it was vague
and overbroad. The court explained
that the phrases "appears to be a
minor" and "conveys the impression" were "highly subjective" and
-.hat there
that a person of ordinary intelligence "could not be reasonably

children,"

is involved leads to criminal prosecution" '0 The court's sole reason
for deeming the CPPA overbroad
was because it felt that Congress
can only regulate depictions of child
pornography using actual children, and the "CPPA is
insufficiently related" to that interest to "justify its
infringement on protected speech." 106
Besides being unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, the court held that preventing the devastating secondary effects on viewers of "pornography apparently depicting children engaging in explicit
sexual activity is not a sufficiently compelling justification for the CPPA's speech restrictions." 107 While
the Ninth Circuit agreed, under its reading of Ferber,
that protecting actual children used in the creation
of child pornography is a "compelling state interest"
sufficient to clear the First Amendment hurdle, 08 the
court overruled the district court and found no compelling interest in regulating sexually explicit images
that do not contain depictions of actual children. 109
The court also concluded that there was no "demonstrated basis to link computer-generated images with
harm to real children," and absent such a link, the
court reasoned,"the law does not withstand constitutional scrutiny." 110

inal

Even though respondents' works fell within
the Act's affirmative defense in Section 2252A(c)
because respondents use only adults in their works
and that they do not market their works as child pornography, the court nonetheless ruled that respondents had standing based on their allegations that the
challenged prohibitions have caused them to refrain
from distributing certain works.97 On the merits, the
court concluded that the CPPA was "content-neutral,"
because it is designed to counteract the effect that
child pornography has on innocent children and not
to regulate ideas. 98 The court concluded that the
challenged provisions "clearly advance important and
compelling government interests: the protection of
children from the harms brought on by child pornography and the industry that such pornography has created" 99 The court further concluded that the prohibitions "burden no more speech than necessary in order
to protect children from the harms of child pornography" 100 Also, the court concluded that under a fair
reading of the Act and its affirmative defenses, it was
"highly unlikely" that the Act would prevent the production of "valuable works." 101 Ultimately, the district
court held that the "appears to be" and the "conveys
the impression" prohibitions were not unconstitution-
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certain about whose perspective
defines the appearance of a minor,
or whose impression that a minor

INTERNET
C. Consideration by the
U
ited
States Supreme Court
Recently, with Attorney General Ashcroft
replacing Janet Reno, the government appealed the
Ninth Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court of the
United States. " The Court heard arguments on
October 30, 2001. 112 The government continued to
argue that digital child pornography results in many
of the same secondary harms to children as actual
child pornography and expanded definitions of child
pornography were necessary for effective law enforcement. 113 According to reporters, the justices seemed
concerned about the potentially broad sweep of the
CPPA. " When Justice Stephen G. Breyer inquired
why it would not now be a federal crime to rent such
movies as "Traffic" or "Lolita' deputy solicitor general,
Paul D. Clement, responded that the law required the
prosecution to prove that the offense was intentional
and not accidental and that video makers could protect their customers with a written disclaimer that
gave the performer's age. ''5 Reportedly, "the justices

did not seem reassured."
Surm
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A. App~ying the First Amendrnn to
OnflneVirtual Child Pornography
In Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, he
enunciated the principle issue of the case as: "whether
the CPPA is constitutional where it proscribes a significant universe of speech that is neither obscene
under Miller nor child pornography under Ferber."
I7 The Court considered the government's argument
that while digital images do not harm any children in
the production process, Congress had decided "the
materials threaten children in other, less direct ways."
118 The Court also considered the fact that "pedophiles might'whet their own sexual appetites' with the
pornographic images, 'thereby increasing the creation
and distribution of child pornography and the sexual
abuse and exploitation of actual children:" "9 Finally,
the Court heard the government's main argument that
as technology improves it would become more difficult to prove that a particular picture was produced
using actual children, thus, allowing defendants that
possessed actual child pornography to evade prosecution. 20
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The Court quickly disposed of the government's main argument in support of the CPPA, its
necessity for law enforcement, and also denied the
government's argument under Ferber that virtual child
pornography is also 'intrinsically related' to the sexual
abuse of children" 121 According to the Court,"While
the Government asserts that the images can lead
to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is
contingent and indirect. The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon some
unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts."
122 Since the Court deemed the CPPA
to cover materials beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and
Miller, thus, abridging the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech, the Court held that
the CPPA was overbroad and unconstitutional. 123
However, though the Court quickly considered
and dismissed the "advocacy of illegal conduct" justification for the CPPA's ban on digital child pornography,
the Court's brief treatment of the rationale seemed to
indicate that it may have been swayed by a more fully
developed argument incorporating the Brandenburg
analysis and more evidence of a closer link between
virtual child pornography and harm to real children.
124 Citing Brandenburg, the Court reminded
that"The
government may suppress speech for advocating the
use of force or a violation of law only if'such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action"...
125 According to the Court, "The Government
has
shown no more than a remote connection between
speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and
any resulting child abuse. Without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may not
prohibit speech on the ground that it may encourage
pedophiles to engage in illegal conduct:" 126 Seemingly,
the Court left open the possibility that a more fully
developed argument incorporating the Brandenburg
analysis and more evidence linking digital child pornography to harm of real children could have been
sufficient grounds to uphold the CPPA against First
Amendment scrutiny.

Im inn

Lals

Acto

Before 1996, the actual participation and abuse
of children in the production or dissemination of pornography involving minors was "the sine qua non of
the regulating scheme." 127 However, in 1996, Con-
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gress became aware of the documented evidence that
the possession and distribution of digital child pornography also causes actual harm to children. 128 Unfortunately,the main rationale allowing the CPPA to survive
First Amendment scrutiny in four federal appellate
court decisions 129 - that the CPPA is designed to
counteract the effect that digital child pornography
has on innocent children (specifically, its use in seducing children to engage in sex acts) and not to regulate
ideas - was challenged and shot down by the Supreme
Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. 130 However, in the wake of the Court's decision in Free
Speech, a legitimate, yet largely unexplored argument
by the Government in its appeal to the Supreme
Court seems to support the CPPA's ban on digital
child pornography. In fact, there remains a strong
argument that production of digital child pornography
can be considered "advocacy of illegal conduct" that
incites "imminent lawless action" and can be regulated
under Brandenburg. "' As applied in this context,
the way pedophiles use virtual child pornography is
"likely to incite" 132 pedophiles to seduce and harm
children. Specifically, evidence that digital child pornography "whets the appetite" "I of pedophiles supports the conclusion that such images "incite imminent
lawless action,"' 31 4 causing pedophiles to be stimulated
into action, resulting in harm to real children.

A. Brandenburg v. Ohio: Exploring the
"Advocacy of Illegal Conduct" Exception
The defendant in Brandenburg was convicted
under an Ohio statute for "advocating violence," after
he invited a news reporter to tape portions of a KKK
rally that were replayed on the evening news in which
the defendant gave a speech filled with hateful remarks
towards blacks and Jews. "I According to the Court,
the tape of the KKK leader's speech played on the
evening news amounted to nothing more than mere
advocacy of illegal conduct that was insufficient to pass
the First Amendment hurdle. 136 In fact, the Court
held that a State may only forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation, "where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action." 117 In applying Brandenburg to the digital child
pornography scenario, it becomes clear that the Court
left two important questions unanswered. Depending on the answers to those questions, a strong argument can be made that the CPPA's ban on digital child
pornography is constitutional under the Brandenburg
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analysis.

I. What Sort of Speech
"Incites Imminent Lawless Action"?
In trying to define "imminent" for purposes of
this First Amendment exception, Brandenburg gives
very little guidance except to say that a KKK rally
where the defendant's exclamation, "bury the niggers,"
was broadcast on the nightly news did not "incite
imminent lawless action." 138 Though giving no guidance as to what would constitute "imminence," the
Court did go on to mention several other examples
of speech that would merely be considered "advocacy of illegal conduct" and would retain FirstAmendment protection, including: advocating or teaching the
duty, necessity, or propriety of violence as a means
of accomplishing reform; publishing, circulating, or displaying a book containing such advocacy; or justifying
the commission of violent acts with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. 319 Though Brandenburg
gives little specific guidance as to what does constitute,"inciting imminent lawless action," it is clear from
the Court's non-imminent examples that a very direct
link is necessary between the inciting speech and the
lawless action it inspires.

I. What Effect, if Any, Does the
"Audience" of the Concerned Speech
Have on Whether the Speech is Likely
to Incite Imminent Lawless Action.?
In Brandenburg, the "audience" of the defendant's speech included the entire general public that
happened to be watching the evening news the night
of the KKK rally news clip. 140 Perhaps the Court
felt that the defendant's hateful comments would not
incite any sort of similar lawless action on the part of
the general public because it was not likely that a very
high percentage of the television viewers shared the
same feelings of hatred as the KKK leaders, such that
they would be incited to go out and harm blacks and
Jews. In fact, it seems most likely that the Court felt
that the views expressed in the KKK video were so
radical that they would have no effect of encouraging
violence similar to that encouraged in the video, especially among the general public. Ultimately, though
not mentioned specifically by the Brandenburg Court,
taking the "audience" into consideration seems likely
to be a major factor in determining the "imminence"
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of lawless action.

B. Imminent Danger to Children Exists
As Pedophiles "Whet Their Appetites"
mHow th C
A an The~oricly
Consit [ rna Under Brandenurg
Remembering the necessary balance of interests that must be struck between protecting the interests of children and infringing on the right to "free
speech" by regulating the production and dissemination of digital child pornography, it still seems that
the CPPA might withstand First Amendment scrutiny
under the analysis of Brandenburg. In fact, when the
CPPA's ban on digital child pornography is analogized
to the facts of Brandenburg, the following scenario
results: Consider whether it would be constitutional
to ban digitally created images of KKK members killing or torturing blacks, where such images are passed
among other KKK members with the intention that
the acts depicted would be emulated by other members. The CPPA proscribes the possession or distribution of digitally created images of child pornography,
an illegal act, normally passed between pedophiles. In
the case of digital child pornography, the "audience" is
likely just made up of pedophiles or other sexual abusers who know how to find child pornography on the
Web. Because the "audience" is made up specifically
of the type of people who are likely to take part in the
crime depicted in the digital photographs, there seems
to be a much greater likelihood of "inciting imminent
lawless action" than if those photographs were shown
to the general public over the nightly news like in
Brandenburg. Also, as contrasted to the situation in
Brandenburg where the nightly news displayed video
footage from a rally depicting the encouragement of
lawless action by the KKK leader, digital images of children involved in sex acts depict actual lawless action
taking place.
Further,consider the above hypothetical where
there is evidence suggesting that the digital photographs depicting the KKK's violence toward blacks, circulated among members of the KKK, results in the
commission of those same digitally depicted acts perpetrated against real blacks and Jews. Under this scenario, it seems likely that the Court in Brandenburg
would have considered the advocacy of illegal conduct much more "imminent,' such that the digital photographs depicting violence toward blacks and Jews
would not be protected by the First Amendment.
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Under that same analysis, due to the evidence suggesting that pedophiles use digital photographs to
"whet their appetites," there seems to be a strong
argument that the CPPA's ban on digital child pornography should withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
In fact, the Court in Free Speech seemed to hint at
that the possibility of that conclusion, but found that
"without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may not prohibit speech on the
ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in
illegal conduct." 141 Here, though the government had
barely mentioned an argument for the CPPA's constitutionality under Brandenburg, the Court seemingly
admitted that if the government had shown "more
than a remote connection between speech that might
encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child
abuse," 142 the CPPA could be deemed constitutional.

IL. Evidence of the Imminent Lawless
Action that Digital Child
Fon ography Incites and
Past Coirts'Consideration of Such
Evidence suggests that digital child pornography incites several types of lawless action, including:
downloading actual child pornography, distributing and
sharing files of actual child pornography, and most significantly, seducing and molesting actual children. 141
In fact, according to many researchers, virtual images
whet the appetite of pedophiles and "fuel the market"
for pornography involving real children. 144
For example, the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography concluded that child pornography is not only used to break down the inhibitions and
resistance of children, but feeds the appetite of pedophiles. 141 Congress found that child pornography can
have that effect, regardless of whether the pornography takes the form of computer-generated images
or photographs of real children. 146 Congress also
heard evidence that computer-generated images of
children engaged in sexually explicit conduct are often
exchanged for pictures of real children engaged in such
conduct. 147 Further, Congress learned that because of
that phenomenon, the production and distribution of
computer-generated child pornography helps sustain
the market for the production of visual depictions that
involve real children. 148 While this evidence shows
how digital child pornography incites pedophiles to
engage in the lawless action of downloading, possessing, and distributing actual child pornography, most
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significant is the inference that pedophiles use digital
child pornography to seduce and molest actual children.
While the Supreme Court in Free Speech
claimed there to be little or no empirical proof of the
connection, Congressional hearings on the CPPA produced testimony from a number of scholars and practitioners supporting the inference of a link between
digital child pornography and the seduction of real children. 149 One practitioner, for example, a clinical psychologist specializing in the treatment of sexual compulsions, testified before the Senate Committee that
pedophiles use child pornography to seduce children
into engaging in sexual acts with them. 1so According
to the practitioner, once a youngster is selected, child
pornography is utilized to systematically reduce his
inhibitions through calculated exposure to varying
degrees of the material. "I' After the child's anxiety
to the material has been reduced, the pedophile can
convince him to participate and be photographed. 152
The child, after having seen 'all the other kids do it'
and being reassured by a trusted adult friend, will participate in sexual conduct with the pedophile. "I The
pedophile needs the child pornography to facilitate the
seduction of other children. 154 Clearly, one of the
primary uses of child pornography, and, thus virtual
child pornography, is for the systematic desensitization, as part of an insidious process, to induce children
to engage in the acts depicted. 155
Past courts have recognized this and have also
been concerned with the problem. For instance, the
need to prevent pedophiles from using child pornography to "seduce other children into sexual activity"
by lowering their inhibition to engage in sexual conduct was a major concern of the Osborne Court and
one of the reasons it found a substantial government
interest in regulating digital child pornography. 156 The
Osborne Court expressly stated that preventing the
use of child pornography to seduce children is a valid
state interest. "I The Court adopted the findings of
the 1986 Attorney General Report that explained how
pedophiles use child pornography featuring children
engaged in sexual activity with the aim of persuading
the child viewers to believe that if other children are
doing it, then it is acceptable. s The Osborne Court
indicated that the state's interest in protecting children extended to material other than child pornography, i.e., depictions that facilitate the sexual abuse of
children. ,59 Therefore, Osborne recognized that the
state's interest in protecting children from devastating
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effects of child pornography applied to the protection
of all children, including not only children who could
be abused in the creation of pornographic materials,
but also child viewers of child pornography who could
be seduced into sexual activity through exposure to

such materials.

160

Also, though its focus was on the harm done
to children in the actual production of child pornography, the Ferber Court described how the distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity
is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children
and how its distribution encourages the production
of more child pornography. 161 Similarly, the court in
United States v. Hilton noted that distribution of digital child pornography would provide encouragement
for production of real child pornography. 162 Further,
the Hilton court believed that depriving child abusers
of a "criminal tool" frequently used to facilitate the
sexual abuse of children is the main purpose of the
CPPA, which mirrors the reason for the original ban
on actual child pornography. 163 As the Fourth Circuit
found in Mento, the government's interest in protecting all children from the sexual exploitation resulting
from child pornography - not just children used in
its production - is compelling. 164 Finally, as the court
simply stated in Hilton, "considerations beyond preventing the direct abuse of actual children can qualify
as compelling government objectives where child por-

nography is concerned."

165

M. Doubting th

Clim o Ove r

outs
d h:

How the CPPA is Narrowly Taior>
Unlike the court in Free Speech Coalition v.
Reno, four other circuits considered claims that the
CPPA was overbroad and vague and all found that the
CPPA passed constitutional muster. 166 All four circuits upholding the constitutionality of the CPPA recognized that Congress only intended for the "appears
to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions of
the CPPA to reach a narrow category of materialdepictions that are "virtually indistinguishable to the
unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic
images of actual children engaging in sexually explicit
conduct." 167 In response to vagueness claims, the
Hilton court found that the CPPA's "provisions 'suitably limit' the reach of the Act so that a person of
ordinary intelligence can easily discern likely unlawful
conduct appropriately." 168 In fact, the district court
in Hilton, which had considered the defendant's vague-
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ness and overbreadth challenges, found that the statute was narrowly-tailored because it"directly advances
this (Ferber) objective by limiting the possession and
distribution of visual depictions that are, or appear
to be, of children engaged in sexual activities. 169 The
court in United States v. Fox, 170 which also held that
the CPPA was neither constitutionally overbroad nor
vague, was in accord with the reasoning of the First,
Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits in concluding that "taken
together, the statute's scienter requirement and affirmative defenses provide sufficient protection against
improper prosecution." 171 Finally, as the court in Fox
noted,"the 'appears to be' language is not so subjective
as to fail to put reasonable persons on notice of what
it is that the statute prohibits." 172

1.Eno

C. Counterarguments
h Evidnce of a Link to Ham?

In Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, the Ninth
Circuit found the contested provisions of the CPPA
unconstitutional, but indicated that a proper demonstration of a nexus between computer-generated child
pornography and harm to real children could effectively recast the issue. '71 Similarly, the Supreme Court
in Free Speech declared that the government lacked
sufficient evidence linking digital child pornography to
harm of real children. 174 While more definitive proof
would be helpful in demonstrating to CPPA opponents
the real harm caused by digital child pornography, as
one commentator pointed out, "to the extent that
these crimes remain silent and secretive due to children's inability to bring their harm to the surface, we
are left with little empirical research." 171
11. Movies and Other Works

of Art Banned?
Another problem with banning images that
"appear to be" minors engaging in sex acts is the possibility of sweeping away works of value to society
that do not involve the use of actual children in production and are likely not used as seduction tools by
pedophiles. However, according to the legislators who
passed the CPPA, 176 as well as the court in U.S. v. Fox,
materials or works with any artistic or social value
are not included in the grasp of the CPPA. 17 Also,
the court in Fox, found that "any imprecision that
may remain at the margins after employing this limiting construction ...is more appropriately handled not
by invalidating the statute, but rather by case-by-case
analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions,
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assertedly, may not be applied." 178 Further, even the
Supreme Court in Ferber noted that it is "unlikely that
visual depictions of children performing sexual acts or
lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often constitute
an important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work" 179
IF

Other Types of Entertainment

and Media Also Arguably Incite
Imminent Lawless Action
Though the Brandenburg analysis lends support to the CPPA's constitutionality based on the
way digital child pornography whets the appetite of
pedophiles, critics of this justification for the CPPA's
encroachment on the right to "free speech" may argue
that many other types of entertainment depict or even
encourage lawless action as well. For example, movies
or television shows depicting the use of drugs and
violence could arguably incite lawless action among
the viewers. However, the difference between lawless
action depicted by most other types of media and the
lawless action encouraged by digital child pornography
has to do with the imminence of the lawless action,
which is or may be incited. Like the depiction and
encouragement of violence on the nightly news in the
Brandenburg case, the audience for movies and television shows is made up of the general public. Considering such a broad audience, any depiction or encouragement of lawless action would be unlikely to have an
imminent effect on the viewers and would most likely
be deemed mere advocacy of illegal conduct. Based
on Brandenburg, there must be a direct link between
the speech and the imminent lawless action that it
incites. Seemingly, such a direct link is only presented
in situations where, as in the case of digital child pornography, the depiction or encouragement of lawless
action is presented to or sought out by the very
narrow, specific audience that is likely to be stimulated
to react to it. For this reason, other forms of media
like movies and television that depict lawless action do
not reach the level of imminence required by Brandenburg, and, thus, retain First Amendment protection.

For many reasons, the CPPA's ban on digital
child pornography is a worthy prosecutorial effort. 180
Ultimately, while no children are used in the production of digital child pornography, evidence strongly suggests that actual children are still harmed as a result

Reacting to Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and the Burial of the CPPA
of the possession and distribution of virtual child pornography. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, Congress' attempt to protect children from the harms
presented by virtual child pornography was deemed
unconstitutional. 18' However, the government did not
thoroughly explore all arguments in support of the
CPPA. Ultimately, the CPPA would be best packaged
to withstand constitutional scrutiny through a detailed
consideration of the Brandenburg rationale. Analogizing the Brandenburg facts and reasoning to this specific situation offers the most support for finding that
the CPPA's ban on virtual child pornography passes
First Amendment muster.
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